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Social Suffering, Gender, and Women’s Depression
Jeanne Marecek
There is nothing the matter with one but a temporary nervous depression –
a slight hysterical tendency – what is one to do? (p. 10)
I get unreasonably angry with John sometimes. I’m sure I never used to
be so sensitive. I think it is due to this nervous condition.
But John says that if I feel so I shall neglect proper self-control; so I take
pains to control myself – before him, at least, and that makes me very tired.
(p. 11)
But these nervous troubles are dreadfully depressing.
John does not know how much I really suffer. He knows there is no reason
to suffer, and that satisfies him. (p. 14)
I don’t feel as if it was worth while to turn my hand over for anything,
and I’m getting dreadfully fretful and querulous.
I cry at nothing, and cry most of the time. (p. 19)
Charlotte Perkins Gilman, 1899/1973
These lines are from The Yellow Wallpaper, a short story composed by Char-
lotte Perkins Gilman at the turn of the 19th century. Gilman was no stranger
to social suffering. The story was, as Elaine Hedges puts it, “wrenched out
of her own life” (1973, p. 37). Gilman was an outspoken leader and the-
orist of the feminist movement of the late 1800s, regarded by some as its
leading American intellectual. Gilman’s focus was primarily on women’s
economic dependency in marriage, which she regarded as the linchpin
of female subordination (Gilman, 1898). Despite her political convictions,
Gilman herself was trapped by the prevailing conventions of marriage and
motherhood. Shortly after the birth of her first child, she fell into grinding
misery. She described her condition as a “growing melancholia,” consisting
of “every painful mental sensation, shame, fear, remorse, a blind oppres-
sive confusion, utter weakness.” (Gilman, 1935, p. 90). She experienced “a
constant dragging weariness miles below zero. Absolute incapacity. Abso-
lute misery.” She would often “crawl into closets and under beds to hide
from the grinding pressure of that profound distress” (Gilman, 1935, p. 91).
283
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Gilman’s words bespeak what we today would recognize as profound
depression. She speaks of exhaustion, melancholy, misery, guilt, constant
crying, and weakness. Yet, in keeping with the diagnostic conventions of
her times, she was diagnosed not with depression but rather with neuras-
thenia and “nervous prostration” with a “slight hysterical tendency.” Dr.
Silas Weir Mitchell, a leading psychiatrist of the day, treated her. Mitchell
was known throughout North America and Europe as an expert in the
treatment of women with ailments like Gilman’s. Indeed, Sigmund Freud
is said to have expressed a keen interest in Mitchell’s treatment methods
because he himself sought to help women in similar distress.
Mitchell’s prescription was a rest cure that enforced continual bed rest
and constant feeding with rich, heavy food such as cream and sweets. It
was common for his female patients to gain up to 40 pounds on this reg-
imen and such weight gain was considered curative. Mitchell demanded
that patients refrain not only from physical activity but also from intel-
lectual endeavors and social stimulation. Gilman’s fictional heroine, for
instance, is chastised for jotting brief notes in a small notebook in violation
of her doctor’s orders. The regimen was both authoritarian and infan-
tilizing, requiring female patients to submit without question to isolation,
passivity, and medical control over their lives.
Throughout the novella, the heroine of The Yellow Wallpaper voices ten-
tative critiques of bourgeois marriage, of the stifling norms of wifely and
motherly behavior by which she must abide, of gendered power relations,
and of Dr. Mitchell’s rest cure. In the end, however, she is unable to sustain
those critiques and plunges into the depths of madness, perhaps succumb-
ing to suicide. Charlotte Perkins Gilman’s own story has a better ending,
though not a triumphant one. At the end of a month in Mitchell’s sanitar-
ium, she fled. Her condition, she proclaimed, was worse than when she
had entered. She also fled her marriage because she had come to believe
that she could not regain her mental equilibrium unless she lived inde-
pendently. Although she married a second time, she did not live with her
second husband nor depend on him for financial support for herself and
her child. Instead she eked out a precarious living through her writing and
speaking, sometimes taking in lodgers to make ends meet.
Why begin a discussion of women and depression with a lengthy
description of a woman who lived 100 years ago and was never diagnosed
as depressed? Charlotte Perkins Gilman’s suffering has several lessons for
those of us who are interested in the connections between gender and psy-
chosocial suffering, and, more broadly, in psychopathology as an object
of scholarly inquiry. I am not concerned to debate whether Gilman was
really depressed or not. For sure, she suffered mightily. Gilman’s story
warns us against the intellectual mistake of reifying diagnostic categories
such as depression. Like any psychiatric diagnosis, depression is a cul-
tural category arising in a particular time and place. In Gilman’s time,
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other categories named her suffering. Moreover, the diagnostic category
of depression encompasses just a small fraction of the total field of depres-
sive suffering.
Gilman’s situation holds lessons about the gender politics of psycho-
logical suffering and of its diagnosis and treatment. The Yellow Wallpaper
can be read as a meditation on the gap between expert knowledge and
lived experience. Dominant discourses of her time, such as that of Dr.
Silas Weir Mitchell, put forward an etiology of Gilman’s condition that
was grounded in neural physiology. (For Mitchell and other psychiatrists
of his time, the term nervous exhaustion had the literal meaning of a ner-
vous system overtaxed to the point of depletion.) Gilman and her heroine
give voice to a different etiology, one grounded in social relations, gen-
dered structures of power, and the confines of conventional domesticity.
Gilman lived and wrote at a time (not unlike the latter decades of the
20th century) when some women were asserting new rights and demand-
ing changes in gendered power relations in public and private life. It
is hardly surprising that she and several other prominent feminists and
female leaders seemed particularly prone to the conditions then called
neurasthenia, nervous prostration, nervous exhaustion, and hysteria.
Living in a time of social flux, they flouted the norms of proper feminine
decorum. Often they were vilified or ridiculed by their social circle or by
the press. No doubt they sometimes experienced self-doubts and inter-
nal conflict as they found themselves embroiled in situations fraught with
contradiction.
The theme of this chapter is that cultural narratives organize, provide
significance for, and influence the form, frequency, and social relations
of women’s depression. My orientation therefore diverges sharply from
most of the other contributors, as well as the editors. I take categories
of disorder, such as depression, as cultural artifacts shaped in response
to prevailing concerns at different periods of history. I do not assume
that such categories are universal, fixed natural entities awaiting scien-
tific investigation. Gilman’s tale points toward two contrasting narratives
of women’s suffering. The medical establishment of her day put forward
explanatory narratives grounded in physiology and notions of inherent
feminine weakness. Such explanations direct our gaze toward the indi-
vidual in isolation, set apart from culture and social context. In contrast,
Gilman put forward a narrative concerned with gendered power dynamics,
thwarted self-expression, and culturally imposed limitations. She pointed
not to inherent deficiency but to structural inequities of power. Accounts
like Gilman’s insist that depression and other forms of disorder are social
suffering; they situate suffering in social, cultural, and political contexts.
The bifurcation between biologically based accounts of psychological
distress and social accounts has proven remarkably durable in North
American psychology. Biological foundationalism too has persisted in
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North American intellectual life, particularly in psychology, in spite of
a long line of trenchant critiques (e.g., Haraway, 1981). Even today, dis-
cussions of female psychology typically are initiated by first considering
bodily difference (such as genes, hormones, brain differences, and neuro-
chemistry). In that way, biology is made to appear as if it were the ground-
ing for social experience.
In North America, the dominant accounts of depression and other cate-
gories of suffering have focused on the individual as the locus of pathology,
risk, and resilience. Like Gilman, many feminist researchers have endeav-
ored to shift attention to social relations and cultural context. Their accounts
of women’s suffering have emphasized social structures, cultural institu-
tions, and social relations rather than individual deficiency or pathology.
However, such models of suffering typically have been marginalized by
psychological and psychiatric researchers and in the psychotherapeutic
professions. The research technologies typically espoused by North Amer-
ican psychologists channel inquiry away from societal conditions and into
the exploration of individual psyches removed from culture and history
(Henriques, Hollway, Urwin, Venn, & Walkerdine, 1984). Even when psy-
chologists set out to study the societal bases of suffering, the constraints of
the discipline – its structures of thought, its measurement technologies, its
preference for laboratory experiments, and its language practices – often
stealthily transform projects into investigations centered on individuals
lifted out from culture, society, and history. In the specialty journals in
clinical psychology, the individual often appears as a carrier of weakness
or deficiency, whether because of biological inheritance, faulty childhood
socialization, or a life history of traumatic events. Surveying research on
women several years ago, Mary Crawford and I coined the phrase “woman
as problem” to describe this mode of producing knowledge (Crawford
& Marecek, 1989). It remains a prominent approach to conceptualizing
psychopathology (Marecek, 2001).
depression: is it a “woman’s problem”?
For at least three decades, therapists and researchers have identified
depression as a “woman’s problem.” Depression was one of three high-
prevalence diagnoses identified in the Conference on Women and Mental
Health jointly convened by the National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH)
and the American Psychological Association (APA) in 1979 (Brodsky &
Hare-Mustin, 1980). Roughly 10 years later, “women and depression” was
the subject of a Task Force sponsored by the Women’s Program Office of
the APA (McGrath, Keita, Strickland, & Russo, 1990). Ten years later (in
2000), the APA sponsored a “Summit on Women and Depression” (Mazure,
Keita, & Blehar, 2002).
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The claim that depression is a woman’s problem rests mainly on
rates and counts of people with depression. Depression is considered a
woman’s problem because greater numbers of women than men expe-
rience depression and because depression is especially common among
women. Throughout the latter part of the 20th century, researchers in sev-
eral Western European and North American societies noted a preponder-
ance of women among those who experience depression (Weissman &
Klerman, 1977). Women in present-day North America and Europe appear
to have rates of clinical depression that are between two and three times
higher than men’s (Bebbington, 1996; Kessler, McGonagle, Swartz, Blazer,
& Nelson, 1993; Weissman et al., 1993). Moreover, in community surveys,
women usually report more or more severe symptoms of depression than
do men. This gender difference appears to emerge sometime in adoles-
cence and to persist thereafter throughout the lifespan (Mirowsky, 1996;
Nolen-Hoeksema & Girgus, 1994).
Overall, the risk of depression appears to have expanded to younger
and younger age cohorts during the latter part of the 20th century. Prior to
World War II, it appears that depression occurred mainly to people beyond
the age of 40. By the 1970s, however, experts began to diagnose depression
among people in their 20s and 30s. The idea of that children and adolescents
too could suffer from depression took hold in the late 1970s and was linked
to the rise of cognitive theories of depression. Prior to that, psychoanalytic
formulations of childhood ego development held that children lacked the
capacity for depression. (As we shall see later, this idea that depression
requires a degree of psychic maturity was also applied to so-called prim-
itive peoples by colonial psychiatrists.) By the 1990s, experts began alert-
ing the general public to the problem of widespread depression among
teenagers. Today even children between 7 and 11 years of age are said to
be at risk for depression. Are the rates of depression actually changing?
Or have successive generations of diagnosticians and therapists become
more and more astute at uncovering depression? Or have our understand-
ings of depression and its symptom criteria shifted to encompass broader
range of emotional experience and thus to envelop more and more people?
We need to be careful not to essentialize depression or its symptom cri-
teria as monolithic and unchanging entities that exist in isolation apart
from our descriptions of them. Historians of medicine have shown how
various diagnoses and diagnostic categories (among them, schizophrenia,
depression, psychopathy, nymphomania, chlorosis, posttraumatic stress
disorder (PTSD), multiple personality disorder, psychogenic amnesia, and
eating disorders) and their symptom criteria have shifted in accord with
cultural and political trends and, in some cases, disappeared altogether. We
must also avoid the unwarranted assumption that scientific knowledge is
necessarily progressive, always arriving at closer approximations of the
truth.
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Before we declare depression to be a woman’s problem, let us step back
to consider that claim more closely. A number of issues bear consideration:
Is the Gender Gap Universal?
Evidence that women have higher rates of depression than men is limi-
ted to certain locales. The gender gap seems to be specific to Western
Europe and North America. Agricultural societies show little or no gender
difference in rates of depression (McCarthy, 1990). Data from non-Western
countries are skimpy, but reports from India, Thailand, Rhodesia, and
Sri Lanka report no excess of depression among women. Thus, we must
modify the blanket statement that depression is a women’s problem to
a more cautious one, that it may be a Western European and North
American woman’s problem. We should not be surprised that the gen-
der gap is culture specific. The incidence, patterning, and epidemiology of
many disorders differs considerably from one cultural setting to another
(Demyttenaere et al., 2004; World Heath Organization, 2000). As we will
see, what we call depression appears to be nearly absent in some parts of
the world. Although simple cross-national comparisons of rates of depres-
sive symptoms tell us little about culture, they suggest that the culture gap
in depression far exceeds the gender gap. What is surprising is how seldom
culture has been a focus of serious inquiry by psychiatrists or clinical
psychologists.
Has the Gender Gap Been Constant over Time?
Comparisons across historical eras are tenuous because definitions of
depression are not fixed. Nonetheless, it seems unlikely that the current
male–female difference found in Euro-American societies has been con-
stant over time. One can find mention of depression-like thoughts, emo-
tions, and somatic complaints in medical and religious writings from Greek
and Roman times onward. However, historical writings do not mention a
specific female proclivity toward depression. Turning to modern times,
Elizabeth Lunbeck’s (1992) landmark study of the records of the Boston
Psychiatric Hospital in the early 20th century offers a glimpse into the
diagnosis and treatment of women and girls in that era. In Lunbeck’s anal-
ysis, depression and melancholia were not diagnoses of high prevalence for
women and girls treated at the Boston Psychiatric Hospital; indeed, these
categories were only rarely applied to women. The historical evidence is
too scanty and too fragmentary to conclude either that the gender gap has
been constant across history or that it is historically contingent. However,
in the absence of historical evidence for a gender gap in depression, it
seems unwise to presume that such a gap has always prevailed.
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Is Depression a Culture-Bound Syndrome?
Brute comparisons of rates of depression across national boundaries are not
particularly meaningful. Expressions of suffering and demoralization take
different forms in different cultures, within and across national boundaries.
The configuration of emotion, thought, and action that we call depression
is an enactment of suffering that is specific to contemporary Western soci-
eties. It typically involves negative affect, such as sadness and the inability
to experience pleasure, a profound loss of interest in activities, and dimin-
ished zest for life. It also includes profound pessimism and negative beliefs
about the self, as well as bodily symptoms of fatigue, reduced activity,
trouble eating and sleeping, and loss of interest in sex (cf. Hollon, Thase,
& Markowitz, 2002). These experiences have been codified into symptom
criteria in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV;
American Psychiatric Association, 1994) and the International Classification
of Diseases, Tenth Revision (World Health Organization, 2002).
The DSM-IV criteria of depression include only a small fraction of
depressive phenomena. Moreover the affective and cognitive elaboration
of suffering that we call depression is particular to present-day, Western,
industrialized societies. These societies, of course, comprise only a small
fraction of the world’s population. In global perspective, it is the West-
ern expression of depression that is atypical (Jadhav, 1996). For most of
the world’s population, there are other modes of registering and com-
municating social suffering and demoralization. In South, Southeast, and
East Asia, bodily complaints are prominent. In China, for example, suffer-
ing individuals report the sensation of chest pains, as if the heart is being
squeezed (Kleinman & Good, 1985). A substantial proportion of depressed
Sri Lankans describe burning sensations in the body, frequently on the
soles of their feet. They do not register core depressive symptoms, either
in their spontaneous accounts or when completing symptom inventories
such as the General Health Questionnaire (Kuruppuarachchi & Williams,
2001). Indians (both men and women) frequently report semen loss and
accompanying malaise. In Nepal, researchers from a psychosocial orga-
nization administered a standard inventory of depression (the Center for
Epidemiologic Studies Depression Scale [CES-D]) to roughly 100 women
whose circumstances placed them at high risk of depression. Only 3% of
the women scored in the depressed range on the full scale; however, 18%
exceeded the cutoff for depression when only the somatic subscale was
considered, a six-fold difference (Eller & Mahat, 2003). In Nigeria, suffer-
ing individuals report feeling like ants are crawling inside their heads.
“Soul loss” is a culture-specific enactment of depressive suffering among
the Hmong people of Laos. In short, depressive suffering takes varied,
culture-specific forms. These culture-specific forms are overlooked, even
in diagnostic systems designed for international use.
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The meanings and moral valuation of depressive suffering and the pre-
scribed channels for managing suffering are also culture specific. Present-
day Western accounts of depressive suffering (such as the account embod-
ied in the DSM-IV) characterize such suffering as an aberrant experience
and as a secular and medical (perhaps even neurochemical) problem. Such
characterizations are not universal. Indeed, as Obeyesekere (1985) points
out, the idea that such painful affects and cognitions as despair, worthless-
ness, pessimism, self-abnegation, and withdrawal constitute a problem is
far from universal. Among devout Buddhists in Sri Lanka, these painful
affects and experiences arise from the recognition of the existential human
condition. Theravada Buddhist teachings counsel followers to cultivate
willful dysphoria through prescribed meditation exercises. These include
ruminating on death, feces, and bodily decay, as well as meditations on the
impermanence of material goods, social relationships, and worldly plea-
sures. Many other spiritual traditions (including Islam and some forms of
Christianity) have urged believers to cultivate grief, self-abnegation, and
resignation to suffering as part of their spiritual practice. In a number of
religious traditions, the embrace of grief and suffering is a mark of maturity,
full moral personhood, and wisdom. My point is not that medicalized and
secular views of depressive suffering are false or unhelpful. Rather, I only
remind the reader that our views of depression are socially fashioned and
culturally located. As a framework for theorizing and research, they shape
the questions we ask, the phenomena we observe, and the interpretations
we offer.
The range of depressive phenomena that we experience, their mean-
ings (including the moral meanings), and the channels for relief are cul-
turally located. We should therefore anticipate that gender differences in
depression too will be bound up with culture. From a cultural psycholo-
gist’s vantage point, the question is not whether more women than men
meet the symptom criteria for depression in one country or another. Rather
we should ask what strategies for expressing and managing suffering are
available to women and men in particular settings.
Does the Diagnostic Category of Depression Have a History?
Whether seen in the long historical view or in a much shorter one, ideas of
what constitutes depression are not fixed. An intriguing study by Jackson
(1986) describes two idioms of dysphoria in Western history: melancholy
and acedia. The genealogy of each of these terms reflects the religious,
moral, medical, and psychological meanings that are intertwined in our
ideas about depressive suffering. Over the centuries, the meanings of
melancholy have shifted, variously emphasizing somatic, psychological,
and moral aspects. Acedia also underwent shifts in meaning before dis-
appearing entirely. At one time, the construct acedia referred to a state of
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both indolence and sorrow. Thus, acedia had overtones of moral failing as
well as personal distress.
Focusing more narrowly on the past century, we still observe flux in the
diagnosis of depression. You will remember that Charlotte Perkins Gilman
described her mental state in terms that closely resemble current symptom
criteria for major depressive illness. Yet although Gilman received three
diagnoses from leading psychiatrists, none of them alluded to depression.
Perhaps clinical depression was understood differently in Gilman’s day or
perhaps it was eclipsed by other diagnostic categories that were believed to
be the special province of women from Gilman’s background. Contempo-
rary researchers have expended considerable effort to craft explicit, objec-
tive, reliable criteria for diagnosing depression. Nonetheless, the mean-
ings of depressive suffering ebb and flow in response to cultural currents
beyond researchers’ control. Psychiatric diagnoses depend largely on peo-
ple’s verbal reports of their subjective experiences. Hence, they are always
entangled in linguistic practices and cultural meaning systems.
Two current cultural trends seem pertinent to North Americans’ subjec-
tive experiences of depressive suffering. For the past several years, massive
government-supported and commercial campaigns have been explicitly
directed toward remaking popular beliefs about depression. The goal of
these campaigns has been to inform people how vulnerable to depression
they and their loved ones are, to give them tools to self-diagnose depres-
sion, and to promote antidepressant drugs. The government-sponsored
campaigns have successively targeted younger and younger age groups
(high school and college students) and, most recently, men (Kluger, 2003).
Pharmaceutical companies that sell antidepressant drugs have sponsored
even more insistent marketing campaigns. Whatever benevolent motives
they might have, such mass media campaigns are potent cultural inter-
ventions. They promulgate a particular vocabulary for communicating
one’s suffering and for understanding emotional life. They accentuate
psychologized discourses of suffering, selfhood, and social life, displac-
ing philosophical, sociopolitical, or spiritual discourses (Rose, 1996). They
also direct sufferers to remedies (notably antidepressant medication) aimed
exclusively at symptomatic relief. Societal or sociopolitical changes are not
mentioned as a means of alleviating depressive suffering.
The second trend pertains to the culture of psychotherapy. Recent
decades have seen the rise to prominence of the concept of trauma as a
primary explanation for women’s suffering. In this context, trauma refers
to experiences of gender-linked victimization, such as rape, sexual abuse,
and many forms of intimate violence and intimidation. For feminists, the
trauma idiom has offered a compelling means of narrating women’s suf-
fering. It has become a staple in the booming marketplace of popular psy-
chology and women’s self-help. The trauma idiom, along with the diag-
nostic category of PTSD, is in wide usage among feminist therapists and
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others who claim special expertise in helping women. For instance, when
Diane Kravetz and I interviewed 100 self-identified feminist therapists in
the mid-1990s, several told us that trauma or PTSD was the diagnosis of
choice for women. Taking the trauma history was an essential part of a
clinical assessment. As many of these therapists understood it, the bene-
fit of the label PTSD was that it had no implication of psychopathology.
Instead, it signified to the client that she was having a normal response
to a traumatic situation (Marecek, 1999). In contrast to the practitioners’
embrace of PTSD, only a handful made mention of depressive disorders.
Moreover, not one of these 100 experts on therapy for women identified the
treatment of depression as one of her or his specialties. For the time being,
the attractiveness of the diagnostic category of PTSD – a portmanteau that
embraces a grab bag of symptoms and dysfunctions – may be eclipsing
the category of depression, at least among feminist therapists, a group that
constitutes an important subset of therapists who work with women. I
hope that this volume succeeds in calling attention to depressive suffering
and in sparking interest in developing psychotherapies that address the
needs of depressed women.
This is not the place to elaborate the pros and cons of the trauma move-
ment and the emergent field of traumatology. (For critical feminist read-
ings of trauma, PTSD, and related issues, see Burstow, 2003; Haaken, 1998;
and Lamb, 1999.) The point is that cultural and professional discourses
about women’s suffering bring forward alternate constructions of suffer-
ing, alternate names for it, and alternate enactments of it. In the real world
of psychotherapy practice, diagnosing is less a matter of scientific accuracy
than a negotiation with clients (and often third-party payers) to find a use-
ful and acceptable way of framing the clients’ problems. Such cultural prac-
tices and discourses confound researchers’ efforts to produce true accounts
of women and men who are depressed. In recent years, alternate discourses
have often signaled feminist contestation over women’s diagnoses. Indeed,
feminist therapists’ embrace of the categories of trauma and PTSD can be
read as an effort to contest the biomedical perspective that has come to
dominate the mental health professions. Ironically, however, PTSD has
gained credence in the psychiatric mainstream by conforming more and
more closely to the biomedical framework. Indeed, a prominent agenda
for those who call themselves traumatologists has been to establish its
neurobiological basis.
Truth in Tests? Measuring Depression
The discovery of antidepressant medications in the 1960s opened the way
to a new kind of research on treatment efficacy. This research paradigm
required methods of diagnosing clinical depression that were more reliable
than clinical judgment and that yielded finer calibrations of depression.
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Thus, rating scales and inventories replaced clinicians’ judgments. Such
rating scales can be seen as means of narrating depressive suffering.
One of the most common measures of depression is the Beck Depression
Inventory (BDI; Beck, Ward, Mendelson, Mock, & Erbaugh, 1961). The BDI
emphasizes cognitive and affective features that are germane to Beck’s
theories about the cognitive antecedents of depression. In fact, the BDI
was originally designed to serve as an instrument for charting a client’s
week-to-week progress in Beck’s cognitive behavior therapy, not a means
of diagnostic classification. Inactivity, apathy, lassitude, weakness, and the
wide variety of somatic complaints (such as burning feet and semen loss)
are not assessed in detail.
Questions about how depression is measured bear directly on claims of
a gender gap in depression. Is the gender gap a gap in depressive suffer-
ing or in the ways we measure it? Do men and boys express, experience,
and enact such suffering differently than women and girls? If so, we must
ask whether depression inventories index masculine and feminine enact-
ments of depression equally. In our time and place, the emotion practices
of men and boys are very different than those of women and girls (Shields,
2002). Stapley and Haviland (1989), for instance, reported that one of the
strongest gender differences in self-reports of emotions was boys’ tendency
to deny experiences of negative emotion. Also, boys were less likely than
girls to give elaborated reports of emotion connected to affiliative situa-
tions or relationships. Boys elaborated on emotions connected to activity,
aggression, and achievement. If these childhood emotion practices persist
in adulthood, men’s experiences of depressive suffering may not be fully
tapped by depression inventories. Depression inventories for adults typi-
cally do not include items concerned with disturbances in activities (e.g.,
sports) or feelings related to aggression (such as contempt and anger).
Instead they accentuate disturbances in relationships and feelings related
to sadness and despair.
Norms of masculinity in many subgroups of Euro-American societies
put pressure on males to be cool, detached, and tough (McLean, Carey,
& White, 1996; Oransky, 2002). An extreme example can be seen in an
interview that Oransky had with a 15-year-old boy a few months after the
World Trade Center attack in New York City. On the day of the attacks,
the boy confided, he had concealed his fear that his stockbroker father
had died in the attack because he believed his peers would ridicule him
if he appeared upset. This boy and his peers, all from affluent white fam-
ilies, ridiculed emotional expression as “girly” and “faggy.” Manly men,
in these boys’ eyes, deal with adverse events by stoically “sucking it up”
and maintaining an unperturbed front. Do such norms shape men’s enact-
ment of depressive suffering? A study of clinically depressed men sug-
gests that they do (Vrendenburg, Krames, & Flett, 1986). The men’s self-
descriptions emphasized work-related problems (e.g., inability to perform
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adequately; difficulty making decisions) and somatic concerns (e.g., phys-
ical complaints; concerns about their general health). The men did not
acknowledge crying, sadness, or dejection. Depression inventories may
inadvertently accentuate emotion practices that men and boys feel obliged
to repudiate because they are culturally coded as feminine. Inventories
may also omit emotion practices consonant with norms of masculinity,
for example, consuming alcohol or drugs. In settings in which masculine
norms of emotional suppression and toughness hold sway, the extent of
men’s depressive suffering may be underrepresented.
The Epistemology of Epidemiology
The statistical scene setting that epidemiological data entail serves the
rhetorical function of implying that unambiguous facts about depression
are being provided (Reekie, 1994). Rates and counts transform depres-
sive suffering into a bounded category, although in reality, the set of
experiences we call depression is not a fixed entity, but an emergent set
of social practices. The reliance on statistical counts also reproduces a
binary logic of sorting depressed women from normal women. It leads
researchers to focus on searching for psychopathological characteristics or
social experiences that distinguish depressed women from their “normal”
counterparts. Yet, depression is both an ordinary mood state and a clinical
condition; the line between ordinary and pathological is under continual
renegotiation.
Whether or not more women than men are depressed, it is important
to study depressive suffering as a gendered phenomenon. It arises in the
context of gendered social relations and gendered social institutions. The
enactment, expression, and management of depressive suffering are neces-
sarily bound up with cultural configurations of masculinity and femininity.
Indeed, the characterization of depression as a woman’s problem emerged
alongside the emergence of the second wave of feminism in the United
States. Various ways of figuring women’s depression and understanding
its origins closely parallel the ways that late 20th century women came to
understand themselves. It is to this history that I now turn.
women’s depression and women’s liberation
Middle Class Women and the Problem with No Name
Like other progressive movements of the 1960s, the women’s liberation
movement viewed psychotherapy as a suspect cultural institution. Fem-
inists viewed therapists as complicit in perpetuating women’s oppres-
sion. Movement members unleashed relentless critique of psychoanaly-
sis, which was the prevailing theoretical framework of the mental health
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professions. Psychoanalytic theories of female depression viewed nor-
mal femininity as incorporating such qualities as masochism, low self-
esteem, dependency, disappointment, and inhibited hostility. These traits
inevitably developed once a girl recognized that she lacked a penis. Freud
described this realization as a permanent “wound to her narcissism”
1925/1974), one for which she blamed her mother. A “second reproach”
directed to her mother followed: “It is that her mother did not give her
enough milk, did not suckle her long enough” (Freud, 1931/1974).
For feminists of the 1960s, this kind of theorizing was intolerable.
For them, women’s depression was not a result of inferior anatomy but
a social problem that demanded societal solutions. Naomi Weisstein’s
Kinder, Ku¨che, Kirche: Psychology Constructs the Female, first printed in 1968
and reprinted 30 times thereafter, issued a scathing critique: (1) what is
advanced as scientific dogma about women merely recycles cultural stereo-
types and (2) psychology’s claims about female nature grossly underrate
the influence of social context. A few years later, Phyllis Chesler’s Women
and Madness (1972) charged therapists with putting women in a double
bind. Norms of femininity required certain behaviors (such as emotional
expressiveness and dependence) that were simultaneously regarded as
psychiatric symptoms. Femininity was thus rendered pathological. At the
same time, nonconformity too was judged pathological.
In keeping with the progressive political ethos of the 1960s and 1970s,
women’s liberationists put forward social models of women’s depres-
sion. They sought its causes in the conditions of women’s lives under
patriarchy: Important among these were subordination in marriage;
constricted economic, social, and political roles and opportunities; and
adverse life events and circumstances. The Feminine Mystique, published in
1963 by Betty Friedan, painted a searing portrait of educated, affluent,
suburban wives weeping into the kitchen sink on long, empty after-
noons. Although we might suppose these women were depressed,
Friedan called their demoralization “the problem with no name.” The
book launched a wide public discussion about middle-class marriage.
Friedan’s portrayal of middle class family life as a psychological prison
for women resonated with many female readers and served to galva-
nize middle-class White women’s participation in the fledgling women’s
movement.
Sociological research on the relation between marital status and psycho-
logical distress offered support for Friedan’s charges. Walter Gove and his
colleagues (e.g., Gove & Tudor, 1973) examined the rates of mental illness
(not specifically depression) among men and women with various marital
statuses. Using data from the 1960s, Gove repeatedly produced evidence
that single, divorced, and widowed women had lower rates of mental ill-
ness than comparable men; married women, in contrast, had higher rates.
In a similar study, Laurie Radloff (1975) focused specifically on depression,
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examining symptom inventories gathered in community surveys. Radloff
too reported that married women were at elevated risk for depression in
comparison to other women.
Other sociologists investigated married life more closely. Lopata (1971)
argued that the housewife role was so unstructured and diffuse that
women who were housewives could obtain little sense of efficacy or
accomplishment. Moreover, caring for small children in the confines of
a nuclear household produced social isolation. Others noted that cultural
expectations (bolstered by the opinions of mental health professionals)
held mothers responsible for their children’s lifelong mental health, hap-
piness, and success (Caplan, 1989). Such impossible standards generated
guilt, blame, and a sense of failure. Further, some theorists proclaimed that
older women suffered a depressive empty nest syndrome when their last
child departed from the home, leaving them without a role and sense of
purpose.
The 1970s were a time when dramatic changes were initiated in gender
arrangements in North America, particular among middle-class individ-
uals. Legislative changes cleared the way for women’s participation in
higher education, professional occupations, and public life. Women gained
a new degree of control over their reproductive choices. They entered the
workforce in vast numbers. Progressive couples began to experiment with
new childcare arrangements from day care to shared parenting to commu-
nal child rearing. Ultimately, few of the reforms went as far as feminists had
hoped and many subgroups of women did not benefit from them. Many
early claims and reforms pertained mostly to privileged women. For exam-
ple, the possibility of personal fulfillment through paid work could only be
realized by women who had access to rewarding jobs. For less advantaged
women, low-wage jobs such as domestic service, assembly-line labor, and
service jobs could well be tantamount to drudgery and economic exploita-
tion. Nonetheless, the ethos of the times fostered scientific interest in social
models of depression and other psychological difficulties. Popular culture,
public institutions, and social researchers were open to the idea that social
arrangements, institutional structures, and cultural values were implicated
in women’s depression.
Adverse Life Experiences
The idea that bouts of depression can be triggered by adversity has a long
history in social research and robust support. Freud drew the connection
between depression (or melancholia, as he termed it) and bereavement
in 1917. The landmark studies of Brown and Harris (1978) identified a
number of adverse life circumstances that raised the risk of depression
among the women they studied in Camberwell, a working-class district of
London. A more recent study found that more than 80% of people with
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major depression reported that adverse life events had taken place shortly
before they became depressed (Mazure, Keita, and Blehar, 2002).
The connection between adversity and depression (and many other
forms of psychological distress) is a robust one. But can it explain
the gender gap? Are women subject to a greater number of adverse
experiences than men? Are there certain experiences that are unique to
women and precursors of depression? Feminist researchers and practi-
tioners have focused on gender-based violence and its effects on women’s
psychic life. They insisted that it was a common occurrence and often a
devastating one for women. They also insisted that it was linked to gen-
dered power relations and cultural sanctions for male dominance, sexual
aggression, and physical violence. Some depression researchers argued
that sexual violation and intimate violence – adverse experiences that pre-
dominantly affect women and girls – might account for the gender gap
in depression (e.g., Cutler & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991). Rape, sexual abuse,
and intimate partner violence, however, lead to any of a large array of psy-
chological and behavioral difficulties (Koss, Koss, & Woodruff, 1991). It is
difficult to make the case that they are specifically connected to depression.
Moreover, the response of any particular woman to such violation depends
on a complex of factors. These include the circumstances surrounding the
victimization, its subjective meaning to the victimized woman, the after-
math (including experiences with medical personnel, police, and legal sys-
tem), the victim’s psychological resources, and the social supports available
to her. Although the connection between adverse events and depressive
suffering seems unassailable, it does not seem particularly useful to search
for a single objectively defined class of events that will account for women’s
depression.
the rise of personological theories
Social models of women’s depression resonated with feminist critiques of
society and the mood of progressive social change that marked the 1970s.
The 1980s, however, witnessed a sea change in American public life. The
1980 presidential election marked a dramatic swing to social and politi-
cal conservatism, which included the rise of the religious right, a cultural
backlash against feminism, the remedicalization of psychiatry, and the cor-
poratization of medicine. Following in the culture’s footsteps, scientific
psychology shifted to the right as well. For example, the focus of atten-
tion shifted to genetics, the evolutionary basis of gendered behavior, and
the neurochemistry of psychological disorders. Many in the mainstream of
psychology and psychiatry saw this shift as a corrective to the misguided
and unscientific emphasis on the sociopolitical and societal contributions
to psychological disorder.
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In a less overt way, the study of gender in psychology shifted in the con-
servative direction as well. For many psychologists, the focus of interest
shifted from social forces to the psychic interior. The theorists who cap-
tured the stage were psychotherapists and personality theorists who pro-
posed personological explanations of women’s depression. These explana-
tions emphasized such factors as personality traits (e.g., lack of assertion,
acquiescence, dependence on others, suppression of anger, and low self-
esteem), patterns of thinking, modes of interacting, or self-structures that
were presumed to be distinctive to women. Although theorists regarded
these qualities as originating in early social conditioning, they conceptual-
ized them as qualities within the person, not as relational practices arising
from and maintained by ongoing social life.
One example of a personological theory is response style theory (Nolen-
Hoeksema, 1991). According to this theory, when women confront negative
emotions, they engage in rumination. That is, they focus passively on their
feelings of distress and on the possible causes and consequences of these
feelings. Men, in contrast, engage in distraction, pushing away bad feel-
ings by diversionary activities such as sports, drinking, and watching TV.
Nolen-Hoeksema argued that rumination intensified depressed affect and
hopelessness and thus could precipitate a full-blown clinical depression;
distraction was a more effective coping strategy. Nolen-Hoeksema’s claim
of a global male–female difference in response style mirrored a prevalent
gender stereotype. However, the idea that women ruminate and men dis-
tract themselves was not substantiated in further studies. People’s reports
of their coping strategies show more complex patterns and less gender
differentiation. Both men and women sometimes ruminate and sometimes
distract themselves (Strauss, Muday, McNall, & Wong, 1997). Other studies
showed that the choice of strategy is domain specific, that is, it depends
on what the negative feeling is about. Nolen-Hoeksema herself eventually
abandoned her idea that rumination and distraction were gender-linked
traits (Nolen-Hoeksema & Jackson. 2001).
More generally, explanations for women’s depression based on pre-
sumed gender differences in personality risk oversimplification and over-
generalization. The search for gender difference falsely assumes that
women are a homogenous group with uniform experiences; this con-
ceals the considerable diversity among women (Hare-Mustin & Marecek,
1994). The idea that depressive symptoms reflect overconformity to soci-
etal norms of femininity does not take into account the multiple forms that
depressive suffering takes. Nor does it adequately account for the multi-
ple and sometimes contradictory norms of femininity. It also ignores the
substantial numbers of men who are diagnosed with depression, most of
whom were presumably not socialized to be feminine.
Personological explanations of women’s depression suited the con-
servative times in which they rose to prominence. Although they view
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femininity as a product of social conditioning, they do not develop a
close analysis of when, where, and how such conditioning occurs. Nor
do they explain how it is that women can be recruited to projects of
femininity that exact such a price in emotional pain and dysfunction and
why they remain mired in them. They risk portraying women as docile
victims of culture, who have no means of resistance. Furthermore, per-
sonological explanations place the onus of change on individual women.
They advocate individualistic technologies of change (psychotherapy,
assertiveness training, and cognitive retraining), while leaving social
structures untouched.
cultural feminism and women’s depression
The especial genius of Woman I believe to be electrical in movement, intuitive in
function, spiritual in tendency. [M]ale and female represent the two sides of the
great radical dualism. Margaret Fuller, 1845/1976
The 1980s ushered in a revival of the notion of a great radical gender
dualism, which caught the fancy of a broad swath of North American
women. A subset of feminist thinkers extolled women’s gentle heroism,
harmony with nature, pacifism, superior morality, and ethic of caring
for others. This body of thought became known as cultural feminism. In
psychology, writers such as Carol Gilligan and the Stone Center group
claimed that women were endowed with a unique psychology that encom-
passed qualities of intuition, empathy, beneficence, and the capacity to
nurture others. From these claims sprung another model of women’s
depression.
The crux of the model was a radical dualism reminiscent of Margaret
Fuller’s, but framed within psychodynamic theory. In this model, girls and
boys develop distinctively different selves and different capacities for rela-
tionships during the earliest months of life. In the mother–infant dyad, girls
develop a self that is more permeable, less bounded, and more attuned to
others. They develop both a capacity and a need for intimate emotional
relationships. Nancy Chodorow (1978), who formulated the original ver-
sion of this theory, was careful to locate her developmental account in the
context of the gender and family arrangements specific to late-20th-century,
Euro-American, postindustrial capitalism. However, as psychologists and
psychotherapists took up Chodorow’s ideas, her meticulous sociological
groundwork slipped away. What remained was the idea that “the” mother–
daughter relationship (now constituted as universal, not as a contingent
social arrangement) produced a specifically feminine developmental tra-
jectory and personality structure. All women were said to be oriented to
caring for others and to have a special empathic attunement to others’
needs. At the same time, they required emotional intimacy and empathic
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connection in their personal relationships. When intimacy and connection
were unavailable, women could not develop and grow psychologically
(Miller & Stiver, 1997).
Relational theorists have drawn on these ideas to develop accounts of
women’s depression (e.g., Jack, 1991; Kaplan, 1991; Miller & Stiver, 1997).
Dana Jack (1991) has put forward the most substantial account. Jack’s
model of women’s depression involves what she has called “Silencing the
Self,” which is a constellation of self-abnegating beliefs and practices. For
example, some key beliefs are that caring demands self-sacrifice and that
one should inhibit one’s actions and speech to avoid displeasing others.
Some key practices include judging oneself according to standards held by
others and presenting a compliant and agreeable facade despite inner feel-
ings of anger and resentment. In Jack’s model, women have a special fear
of emotional abandonment that emerges from their needs for emotional
intimacy. Therefore, they are prone to silencing the self, that is, suppress-
ing their needs and feelings for fear of losing relationships. Silencing the
self in this way is ultimately self-defeating, however. It leads to a loss of
self and it thwarts any chance for genuine intimacy and connection. This
impasse places women at risk for depression.
This is not the place to recount in detail the intricate bodies of writing
concerning women’s relational identity or the controversies they evoked
(Becker, 2005; Bohan, 1993; Hare-Mustin & Marecek, 1990; Westkott, 1997).
One of the strengths of this body of theory is its careful attention to the
minute details of women’s daily lives and especially to what women them-
selves say. The nuanced accounts of women’s sorrows, joys, ambivalences,
and frustrations often evoke in female readers a sense of deep familiar-
ity. Nonetheless, efforts to validate systematically the gender dualism on
which these theories are grounded have not been successful. For exam-
ple, a meta-analysis of 113 studies found only a small difference between
men and women in the “ethic of care” proposed by Carol Gilligan (Jaffee &
Hyde, 2000). Moreover, two studies, both using a scale that Jack herself has
designed, have found that, contrary to her claim, men had higher scores
than women on a Silencing the Self Scale (Gratch, Bassett, & Attra, 1995;
Jack & Dill, 1992).
Claims about the emotional experiences and identity development of
infants cannot easily be assessed. We do know, however, that even within
the United States, childcare practices vary considerably depending on cul-
tural background, family structure, residence patterns, and economic situ-
ations. The idea that the affective relationship between mothers and their
baby daughters takes a single universal form seems implausible. More-
over, much of the effort to identify a feminine intrapsychic makeup that
puts women at risk for depression rests on observations of women who
are already depressed. Kaplan, Miller, and Stiver, for example, drew upon
case studies of women in their psychotherapy practices. Jack studied a
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group of clinically depressed women. What these theorists described may
aptly characterize women once they are already depressed. But that does
not suffice as an account of how they became depressed (Barnett & Gotlib,
1988).
beyond the medical model: cultural and constructionist
studies of depression
Scientific knowledge is shaped in accord with the social and cultural cir-
cumstances of those who produce it. As Ludmilla Jordanova has said,
It is a mistake to separate the knowledge claims of medicine from its practices,
institutions, and so on. All are socially fashioned, and so it may ultimately be more
helpful to think in terms of mentalities, modes of thought, and medical culture than
in terms of “knowledge,” which implies the exclusion of what is inadmissible. (1995,
p. 362)
Many parts of the knowledge-producing process – deciding what should
be construed as significant facts, choosing which ones are relevant and
important to the question at hand, and crafting an interpretation – are
rooted in a researcher’s epistemological commitments and cultural loca-
tion. Whether implicit or explicit, whether consciously acknowledged or
not, researchers hold some vision of how the world works and that vision
guides our investigations. At best, we can hope to become conscious of
that vision and cognizant of how our place in the world contributes to it.
Depression became identified as a woman’s problem in the context
of the second wave of the North American women’s movement some
35 years ago. Indeed, women’s depression became an object of scientific
curiosity because a group of early feminist psychologists refused to take
women’s unhappiness as normative. Their critiques challenged the normal
versus pathological distinction. They also challenged the medical model
and insisted instead that women’s subordination was the soil from which
depression sprouted. Later epochs of second-wave feminism put forward
different images of depressed women, each with a distinctive moral geog-
raphy and a distinctive understanding of what constituted woman and
femininity. Today, most researchers on women and depression operate on
far less edgy ground than those early feminist critics. They hew to con-
ventional positivist epistemologies and seem to regard canonical research
and diagnostic technologies as unproblematic. Among other contributions,
their work has made women’s health (if not gender and health) a subject
of legitimate inquiry. Moreover, their work has served to insinuate some
sociocultural issues into traditional views of psychopathology (cf. Marecek,
1993). But all epistemologies and technologies are accompanied by
characteristic blind spots, deforming their objects of study in characteristic
ways. For example, work on women and depression has seldom looked
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beyond the notion of gender as qualities located inside individual men and
women. Much of the research remains lodged in a reductive framework in
which internal qualities such as low self-esteem and suppressed anger are
identified as the vital forces behind depressive suffering.
There are few studies concerned with gender and depression that have
looked beyond the medical metaphor of depression, which holds it to be
akin to a physical disease. Medicalized constructs of depression reduce a
complex and socially embedded experience to a single identity. They dis-
count a depressed woman’s account of her experience, no matter how com-
plex, astute, and rich it might be. Her words are meaningful only insofar
as they meet or fail to meet some symptom criterion. (See Stoppard &
McMullen, 2003, for an alternative approach.) Moreover, medical models
of depression seem to obviate the need for investigating the constitutive
nature of society, culture, and history. As Szekely has commented, “Once
a phenomenon has been constructed as a disease, the sociocultural can
only be viewed as a factor that further undermines the weak personal-
ity of the individual” (1989, p. 176). In this final section, I consider some
areas of inquiry about women and depressive suffering that come to mind
once we heed Jordanova’s words and think about mentalities and modes
of thought, rather than knowledge.
The Cultural Politics of Diagnosis
The demarcation of depression as a category of disorder is not a neutral sci-
entific accomplishment, but an endeavor imbued with cultural values and
political interests. Indeed, of all psychiatric categories, depression raises
the most questions of cross-cultural validity (Jadhav, Weiss, & Littlewood,
2001). Transforming certain emotions and practices into disorders pathol-
ogizes them and those who engage in them.
Psychiatric diagnoses inform cultural notions of normality and abnor-
mality, mental health and illness. Historians of medicine have elucidated
many examples of psychiatric diagnoses that were used to control behav-
ior and stigmatize those who did not conform to prevailing standards of
conduct. For example, scholars have detailed various diagnoses used for
women who violated standards of sexual, maternal, or wifely behavior.
Postcolonial theorists have detailed how diagnoses of actors as “mad” and
actions as “madness” justified the coercive power of the colonizers (e.g.,
Mills, 2000).
Suman Fernando (2003) recently recounted the reactions of colonial
psychiatrists when they realized that depression was comparatively rare
among non-Western colonial subjects in some parts of Africa, South Asia,
and Southeast Asia. One might think such apparent immunity from depres-
sion would be regarded as a psychological strength. However, the absence
of depression among colonial subjects was deemed to result from moral
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deficiency (such as “irresponsibility”), psychological immaturity (“psy-
chic underdevelopment”), and primitive and childlike natures. This might
lead us to ponder the meanings and morality of depression in present-day
North American men and women. Depression seems to carry a certain
social stigma, whether the sufferer is a man or a woman. Beyond that, is
the lower prevalence of depression among men regarded as a sign of moral
or psychological immaturity? Is women’s depressive suffering taken as an
indicator of advanced development, greater maturity, moral superiority,
or psychological strength? This seems unlikely. It seems more likely that
a diagnosis of depression may convey connotations of weakness, lack of
agency, and perhaps self-pity. An important topic for further investigation
is whether a diagnosis of depression changes its meaning and moral value
according to the social position of the sufferer.
Antidepressants and the Construction of Subjectivity
At present, in the United States, most people (about 75%) who are
treated for depression receive antidepressant medication (Kluger, 2003).
Antidepressants account for nearly 8% of retail drug sales in the United
States (Pomerantz, 2003). In North America, drugs that modulate other
aspects of psychic life are plentiful as well. This everyday presence
of psychotropic drugs has been incorporated into ordinary people’s
folk psychology. For example, some people now explain depression as
a chemical imbalance; some even refer to chemical depression. Such
simplistic biomedical constructions of self, identity, and disorder may
contribute to a mechanistic view of human life. Moreover, by obscuring
how the social is implicated, they discourage a sociocultural analysis of
depressive suffering. The literary critic Jonathan Metzl (2002) has explored
a genre of literature that he calls the Prozac novel (e.g., Black Swans, Prozac
Highway, Prozac Nation, all written by women). Metzl considers how
sufferers understand the transformations of personality and self wrought
by antidepressants. This kind of study need not be left to literary critics
and it need not be limited to fictional texts.
Producing Gender through Depressive Suffering
Bringing a constructionist viewpoint to the study of women’s depres-
sion opens some novel questions. For social constructionists, gender is
not something people are, but what they do and say to produce them-
selves as (particular kinds of) men and women (Marecek, Crawford, &
Popp, 2004; West & Zimmerman, 1987). Similarly, depression is not some-
thing people have, but a set of practices authorized by the culture through
which people express to others that they are suffering. How have enact-
ments of depressive suffering changed over historical time? Are different
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enactments available to people who occupy different social positions? How
do those enactments reproduce and reaffirm those social positions? What
does women’s depressive suffering accomplish in the social worlds they
inhabit? Does the enactment of suffering serve as a means to effect changes
in contentious social roles and relationships? Is it a means to renegotiate
mutual rights and responsibilities (cf. Hunt, 2000)? Rather than asking if
adverse events cause depression, a constructionist inquiry might construe
adversity as a problem that prompts a woman to initiate a line of action.
Depression in this framework is one of many possible lines of action, not
a passive giving up.
Many scientific stories can be told about women’s depressive suffering.
Each is constructed from a particular theoretical vantage point and each
reflects the gender politics of a particular cultural moment. All are partially
true. Our task is not to sort through them in search of the single correct
one. Nor is it to find a rubric that would bring them all together into a
comprehensive master account. That is impossible because the premises
behind the stories and the disciplinary commitments they entail are incom-
mensurate. In my view, we serve our scholarly purposes well by stepping
back to examine these stories as culture artifacts. We will not only situate
women’s depressive suffering in social and historical perspective, but sit-
uate ourselves in that perspective as well. That way, we can glimpse how
psychology and culture – like discourses in a mirrored room – mutually
constitute each other.
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